

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1779

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9160

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: 3-SGDS

TAGS: PARM, US,UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - REPORT OF LUNCHEON MEETING JULY 1

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NUMBER FORTY-THREE

1. THIS IS REPORT OF LUNCHEON MEETING MOROKHOV,TIMERBAEV
AND STOESSEL/BUCHHEIM ON JULY 1.

2. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN PRIVATE DINING ROOM IN STATE
COMMITTEE BUILDING.

3. DISCUSSION WAS CORDIAL AND SOVIET SIDE SEEMED
ANXIOUS TO PRESS NEGOTIATIONS TO CONCLUSION BEFORE
AUGUST, NOTING THAT AUGUST IS USUAL VACATION MONTH AND
SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON. STOESSEL
NOTED THAT AGREEMENT BY TIME OF SUMMIT WOULD BE DESIRABLE
BUT IS NOT A REQUIREMENT.

4. MOROKHOV REMARKED THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE
SOME PARTS OF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ONLY BE DECIDED "AT
THE HIGHEST LEVEL." BUCHEIM COMMENTED THAT, THEREFORE,
THERE MAY BE SOME THINGS ON WHICH WE SHOULD NOT SPEND
A GREAT DEAL OF TIME.

5. MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAEV PROPOSED TOASTS TO NPT AND
TO SUCCESS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

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6. MOROKHOV STARTED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH REMARKS ABOUT NEED TO GEBIN DRAFTING AGREEMENT NOW. STOESSEL COMMENTED THAT US SIDE IS NOT YET READY TO START THIS PROCESS, THAT SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN TO BE CLARIFIED. MOROKHOV SIAD SOVIET SIDE IS READY NOW, AND TIMERBAEV ADDED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN READY FOR A LONG TIME. MOROKHOV SAID SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT NOW HAVE A TEXT FORMALLY APPROVED BY THER GOVERNMENT, BUT DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEMS IN GETTING APPROVAL FOR WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS. STOESSEL SAID ANY DRAFT LANGUAGE CONSIDERED INITIALLY WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT ON AD REFERENDUM BASIS IN ANY EVENT; MOROKHOV AGREED.

6. IN GENERAL EXCHANGE ON DESIRABILITY OF SIMPLICITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS IN TERMS OF DRAFT AGREEMENT, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TERMS SHOULD BE "SIMPLY AND COMPREHENSIVE."

7. THIS LED TO REMARKS BY TIMERBAEV THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO CAREFULLY FORMULATE AGREEMENT LANGUAGE RELATIVE TO THE FISSION YIELD LIMITATION ON EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, IN ORDER TO GUARD AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIRD COUNTRIES MIGHT FIND IN THIS LANGUAGE A BASIS FOR CLAIMING THAT VALID TECHNOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS CAN BE DRAWN BETWEEN PNE DEVICES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ILLUSTRATED THIS NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM BY NOTING THAT WE SHOULD NOT USE LANGUAGE THAT WOULD ALLOW A THIRD COUNTRY TO SAY THAT A PNE DEVICE IS NOT A WEAPON IF ITS FISSION YIELD IS LESS THAN 0.2 KILOTON OR WHATEVER FIGURE WE AGREE UPON. STOESSEL REMARKED THAT US SIDE IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM AND NOTED THAT IT CANNOT BE HANDLED THROUGH FORMULATIONS THAT MAKE NO MENTION OF A FISSION YIELD LIMITATION IF SUCH A LIMITATION IS REQUIRED. TIMERBAEV SAID SOVIET SIDE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS. BUCHHEIM ASKED IF SOVIET SIDE HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW TO CONSTRUCT AGREEMENT LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FISSION YIELD LIMITATION BUT WOULD NOT BRING WITH IT THIS NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. MOROKHOV SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY IDEAS ON HOW TO DO THIS.

8. STOESSEL SAID THAT MENTION OF FISSION YIELD LIMITATION REMINDED HIM THAT MOROKHOV, IN HIS STATEMENT IN PLENARY
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YESTERDAY, HAD INDICATED THAT FISSION YIELD LIMIT SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS THAT WERE EXCEPTIONS IN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE YIELDS ABOVE THE GENERAL AGREED YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT PAST SOVIET STATEMENTS HAD INCLUDED THE POSITION THAT THE GENERAL AGREED YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE 500 KILOTONS AND THAT A FEW EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR

INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS ABOVE THAT AGREED YIELD LIMIT. STOESSEL THEN ASKED IF MOROKHOV HAD MEANT THAT THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT SHOULD ONLY APPLY TO EXCEPTIONAL EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 500 KILOTONS AND, IF SO, WHAT ABOUT EXPLOSIONS WITH LESSER YIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE YIELD RANGE 150 TO 500 KILOTONS. STOESSEL NOTED THAT IT IS VIEW OF U.S. SIDE THAT FISSION YIELD LIMIT SHOULD APPLY TO EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS AT ALL YIELDS. MOROKHOV SAID HE MEANT THAT FISSION YIELD LIMIT SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO EXCEPTIONAL EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 500 KILOTONS (HE SUBSEQUENTLY QUALIFIED THIS, SEE PARA 9), ALTHOUGH THE FIGURE 500 IS NEGOTIABLE ONCE THE US SIDE INDICATES ITS SUGGESTED FIGURE FOR THE GENERAL YIELD LIMIT. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT IT IS USUAL IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR EACH SIDE TO STATE A PRICE AND FOR BARGAINING TO PROCEED FROM THERE, WHEREAS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE US SIDE HASNOT YET PUT FORWARD ITS PRICE.

9. BUCHHEIM ASKED HOW EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS AS LARGE AS 500 KILOTONS WOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM WEAPON TESTS IF THEY WERE NOT SUBJECT TO ANY CONDITIONS SUCH AS A FISSION YIELD LIMITATION. MOROKHOV SAID THAT EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS COULD BE SUBJECT TO THE FISSION YIELD LIMITATION. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE RATIONALE FOR THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE AND AGREED WITH IT. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT LOW FISSION YIELD EXPLOSIVES WERE APPROPRIATE FOR EXCAVATION ANYWAY.

10. IN MENTIONING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW "EXTENSIVE" (BUT UNSPECIFIED) OBSERVER RIGHTS FOR LARGE EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS ABOVE AN AGREED YIELD THRESHOLD, MOROKHOV SAID IN A SPECULATIVE TONE THAT IT HAD "JUST NOW OCCURRED TO ME" THAT MAYBE IAEA OBSERVERS SHOULD ALSO BE INVITED. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT MAYBE THAT WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA BECAUSE
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THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION IN ORDER TO KNOW WHAT THEY WERE DOING.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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11. BUCHHEIM ASKED WHAT LIMITATIONS ON THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, TO DISTINGUISH THEM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH THESE "EXTENSIVE" OBSERVER RIGHTS. MOROKHOV MADE NO MEANINGFUL REPLY; HE JUST SAID IT WOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT THE EXPLOSIONS WOULD BE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. BUCHHEIM POINTED OUT THAT SOMETHING MORE WOULD BE NEEDED THAN A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF LARGE EXPLOSIONS, BECAUSE TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS DID NOT INVOLVE VERY MANY EXPLOSIONS. MOROKHOV MADE NO MEANINGFUL REPLY.

12. MOROKHOV MADE A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC PENALTIES THAT WOULD ATTACH TO EXCAVATION PROJECTS IF INDIVIDUAL YIELDS WERE LIMITED TO 150 OR 100 KILOTONS. THEN HE ASKED WHY THE US SIDE HAD NOT STATED A FIGURE FOR A SUGGESTED LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT VARIOUS IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS BORE ON THIS FIGURE WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULLY DEVELOPED; ONE CONSIDERATION IS THE ECONOMIC FACTOR JUST MENTIONED, ANOTHER MORE IMPORTANT ONE IS THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY THAT TIMERBAEV HAD MENTIONED EARLIER WITHOUT SUGGESTING A SOLUTION. STOESSEL SAID THAT ANOTHER IS THE PROBLEM OF RELATIONSHIP TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE LTBT. HE ADDED THAT THESE RELATE ALSO TO THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF WORLD OPINION ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH WEAPON TEST LIMITATION AGREEMENTS.

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13. MOROKHOV ASKED WHY WE WERE NOW RAISING THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LTBT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, AS PART OF A PNE AGREEMENT, JOIN IN REAFFIRMING ITS INTENTION TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE LTBT.

14. MOROKHOV THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE COULD NOT

UNDERSTAND WHY THE US KEEPS HANDING THE SOVIET UNION NOTES ABOUT DETECTION OF RADIOACTIVITY FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. HE SAID SOVIET TOP OFFICIALS WERE BEING PATIENT ABOUT ALL THESE NOTES, BUT KEEP BOTHRING HIM AND THE STATE COMMITTEE WITH QUESTIONS AS TO WHY THEY DID NOT ANSWER IN KIND. HE SAID HE KNEW WE DETECTED SOME "SECONDARY" RADIOACTIVE PRODUCTS RESULTING FROM SOVIET WEAPON TESTS, AND ALSO THAT SOVIETS DETECT SUCH RADIOACTIVITY FROM US WEAPON TESTS. HOWEVER, HE SAID SOVIETS HAVE KEPT QUIET ABOUT THESE DETECTIONS FROM US TESTS, ESPECIALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY US SIDE DID NOT DO THE SAME. HE SAID EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SOME DETECTABLE RADIOACTIVITY WOULD BE CAUSED BY ANY NUCLEAR EXPLSION, EVEN A FULLY CONTAINED ONE; AND THAT THE MEANING OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LTBT IS THAT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MUST NOT ADD TO THE GENERAL RADIOACTIVE BACKGROUND. THIS IS THE MEANING OF COMPLIANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

15. MOROKHOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT SOVIET UNION HAS NOTED THAT US NOTES ABOUT DETECTING RADIOACTIVITY FROMSOVIET WEAPON TESTS ALWAYS SEEM TO BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH SOME RELATED DEVELOPMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND THAT THEY THEREFORE ARE DESIGNED TO SERVE SOME POLITICAL PURPOSE OTHER THAN CONSISTENCY OF SOVIET WEAPON TESTS WITH THE LTBT. BUCHHEIM ASKED: LIKE THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS? MOROKHOV SAID YES.

16. MOROKHOV REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT DETECTABLE RADIOACTIVE "SECONDARY" OR "DAUGHTER" PRODUCTS WOULD BE SENT OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS FROM ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, EVEN A CONTAINED EXPLOSION. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGNS, WHICH THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO REVEAL EXCEPT POSSIBLY ON BASIS ON COOPERATION, WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO CARRY OUT EXCAVATION PNES WITHOUT SECRET

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PLACING ANY REPEAT ANY RADIOACTIVITY OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS. HE DID QUALIFY THIS BY REMARKING THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN OCCASIONAL ACCIDENT, BUT NEARLY ALL EXCAVATION PNES CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO SOVIET METHODS WOULD NOT PLACE ANY RADIOACTIVITY OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS.

17. BUCHHEIM MENTIONED THAT EXPERTS IN GROUP IV HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET FAR IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FISSION YIELD VERIFICATION DUE TO SPECIAL TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING RADIOACTIVITY OUTPUT, AND THAT MOROKHOV'S REMARKS NOW SUGGESTED A CONTINUING NEED TO EXPLORE THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR A PNE AGREEMENT. MOROKHOV SAID THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE NOTHING IS INVOLVED THAT WOULD CHANGE THE PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION

OF ISOTOPES IN MELT SAMPLES. HE SAID THE SOVIET APPROACH TO PREVENTING RADIOACTIVITY OUTPUT INVOLVES THREE FACTORS: THE DESIGN OF THE PROJECT; THE DESIGN OF THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE USED, AND SPECIAL EMPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES.

18. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT IT IS THE US VIEW THAT INFORMATION MUST BE EXCHANGED ON THE DEPTH AND GEOMETRY OF THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE, THAT OBSERVERS MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO VERIFY THIS INFORMATION, AND THAT MELT SAMPLES SHOULD BE CARRIED BACK TO THE COUNTRY OF THE VERIFYING SIDE FOR ANALYSIS. VOROKHOV SEEMED TO AGREE THAT INFORMATION COULD BE PROVIDED ON EMPLACEMENT HOLE DIMENSIONS, ALTHOUGH HIS REMARKS WERE AMBIGUOUS. CONCERNING MELT SAMPLES, HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY HIS AUTHORITIES WERE SO OPPOSED TO THEIR BEING TAKEN HOME BY OBSERVERS; IF IT WERE UP TO HIM HE WOULDN'T CARE, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DIDN'T KNOW WHY WE NEEDED TO TAKE THEM HOME. BUCHHEIM MENTIONED THAT MELT SAMPLES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ANYONE WHO REALLY WANTED THEM IF EXCAVATION PNEs WERE EVER CONDUCTED IN THIRD COUNTRIES. MOROKHOV AGREED.

19. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF LTBT COMPLIANCE PROBLEM, STOESEL NOTED THAT THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS CARRIED OUT UNILATERALLY AND EXCAVATION PNEs CARRIED OUT UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT TO WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS ANY KIND OF COOPERATION OR COLLABORATION. MOROKHOV

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ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT.

20. STOESEL SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO THE MATTER OF LTBT COMPLIANCE IN A RESTRICTED MEETING.

21. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, STOESEL NOTED THAT MOROKHOV HAD MENTIONED AGAIN IN PLENARY YESTERDAY THAT THE SIDE CONDUCTING A PNE SHOULD BE ABLE TO INVITE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VERIFYING SIDE IF THE SIDE CONDUCTING THE PNE SAW A CHANCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE EXPLOSION BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS, AND THAT MOROKHOV HAD NOT MENTIONED THAT THE VERIFYING SIDE SHOULD HAVE EXPLICIT RIGHTS OF OBSERVATION TO BE EXERCISED AT THE SOLE DISCRETION OF THE VERIFYING SIDE. BUCHHEIM ADDED THAT TWO KINDS OF PROVISIONS ARE NEEDED, ONE SET SPELLING OUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO PLANNED YIELD, ETC., UNDER WHICH THE VERIFYING SIDE WOULD ENJOY OBSERVATION RIGHTS, SPELLING OUT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS ARE, AND PROVIDING THAT THOSE RIGHTS ARE TO BE EXERCISED AT THE SOLE DISCRETION OF THE VERIFYING SIDE; THE OTHER, A GENERAL PROVISION, COULD BE THAT THE SIDE CONDUCTING A PNE

CAN ISSUE AN INVITATION AT ANY TIME TO THE VERIFYING SIDE TO OBSERVE THE PNE. MOROKHOV AGREED THAT THIS IS THE WAY AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE FORMULATED, BUT THAT OBSERVER RIGHTS TO BE EXERCISED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE VERIFYING SIDE COULD ONLY BE ASSOCIATED WITH EXPLOSIONS "NEAR" AGREED THRESHOLDS.

22. MOROKHOV THEN EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON YIELD THRESHOLDS AND MENTIONED THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE THRESHOLD FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS, 100 KILOTONS AS PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE AND 150 KIKOTONS AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. BUCHHEIM ASKED IF WE COULD SET THAT QUESTION ASIDE FOR A FEW DAYS WHILE OTHER ISSUES ARE BROUGHT TO FULLER STATE OF DEVELOPMENT. MOROKHOV AGREED WITH EVIDENT RELUCTANCE.

23. AT END OF LUNCHEON, MOROKHOV EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WORK ON DRAFT TEXTS COULD BEGIN "WITHIN 10 DAYS AT THE OUTSIDE."

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24. AGREEMENT WAS REAFFIRMED TO HOLD NEXT PLENARY AT 3:00 PM ON JULY 2.
STOESSEL

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